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ABSTRACT 
 
Are You a Good Person, or Just Being Good?  
Social Norms Moderate Consistency and Licensing Effects in Social Media 
 
Yuhosua Ryoo, Ph. D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2019 
 
Supervisors: Minette Drumwright and Lucy Atkinson 
 
When and why do consumers help more or less after engaging in a prosocial 
behavior? This question has been an interesting topic of research especially in this time 
when social media has an influential effect on an individual’s ethical decision making. 
However, little effort has been made to understand and reconcile this conflicting 
behavior. Based on two philosophical approaches to ethics (normative and behavioral), 
this research identifies that consumers act prosocially not only because they are a good 
person, but they want to be viewed as a good person by others. This research makes novel 
predictions that these two motives have differential effects on the pursuit of subsequent 
prosocial behavior, and the dominance of a particular motive is determined by the type of 
social norms that are used in an initial prosocial campaign. Across three studies, the 
present research demonstrates that consumers express more favorable reactions toward 
the subsequent prosocial campaign when their initial prosocial behavior is encouraged by 
a normative message highlighting what they ought to do – the consistency effect of 
injunctive norms. On the contrary, consumers show less favorable responses toward the 
subsequent prosocial campaign when their initial prosocial behavior is motivated by a 
 vi 
normative message that described how the majority of people behave in that situation – 
the licensing effect of descriptive norms. Two dimensions of moral identity (moral 
internalization and moral symbolization), which represent two motives for helping 
behavior, mediate the consistency effect of injunctive norms and the licensing effect of 
descriptive norms, respectively. This paper also proves how an additional moral message 
highlighting the internal aspects of helping behavior can mitigate the licensing effect of 
descriptive norms. Three causes that are important in society (helping underprivileged 
children, helping homeless people, and helping people with disabilities) and two different 
online platforms (Facebook and a website) are used to ensure the generalizability of the 
research. This paper is expected to spur future work clarifying divergent findings and 
examining consumers’ sustainable prosocial behavior. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
• More than 750,000 nonprofits have used Facebook’s fundraiser service to raise 
funds, and millions of dollars are going to charities through it (Facebook, 2018). 
•  67% of nonprofits across the globe are set up to accept online donations, and 
12.1% of all charitable donations ($31 billion) were made online in 2017 (The 
Non Profit Times, 2018). 
• 55% of people who engage with nonprofits on social media end up taking some 
sort of action (e.g., volunteer, donate personal items, participate in charitable 
events in their community), and 58% of those people donate money (The Non 
Profit Times, 2018). 
Social media marketing has become standard practice for those in the prosocial 
sector to expand their sphere of influence. Social media’s interactive and decentralized 
environment enables requesters to engage strategically with new, larger, and younger 
audiences in a cost-effective manner. Social media’s two-way communication between 
an organization and its network of constituents generates a greater degree of user 
involvement and interactivity (Lovejoy et al., 2012). Charitable organizations now 
actively incorporate digital into their overall business objectives in addition to 
conventional methods of a charitable campaign such as flyers, direct mail, door-to-door 
solicitation, and telemarketing campaigns. The adoption of social networks in nonprofits’ 
campaigns is widely known as the key to campaign success in terms of promoting their 
causes and building a meaningful relationship with potential and current donors.  
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The growing use of social networking-based, charitable giving campaigns has also 
substantially changed consumers’ decision-making processes, compared to those seen in 
traditional charitable contribution studies, in at least three ways. First, the dramatically 
increased number of charitable campaigns in social media allows consumers to be 
inevitably exposed to a variety of causes. Facebook, Twitter, Pinterest, and Instagram 
spread the word about causes to current and potential supporters. As friends or family 
learn about the causes, they can share them with others. As a result, consumers are forced 
to view numerous causes every day. Secondly, aside from the frequency of requests, the 
time between requests also matters. In social media, one can be solicited by another cause 
right after the decision to give to the initial cause. This immediate request pushes 
consumers to decide whether to engage with a new cause or not in the course of a short 
time. Lastly, social media sites have launched new features such as one-click support that 
leads potential supporters to participate quickly and easily in campaigns more than ever. 
In light of the increased frequency of requests, the reduced time between requests, and 
the ease of responding to requests, a question that has been relatively neglected in the 
traditional prosocial research has received an increasing attention in charitable campaigns 
in social media: how does an individual’s prosocial decision making for one charitable 
campaign affect her prosocial decision making for a subsequent campaign? 
Two distinct and seemingly opposing streams of findings have been reported in the 
literature. On the one hand, there are studies demonstrating that after engaging in a 
prosocial behavior, individuals are more likely to act prosocially in a later campaign 
(Cornelissen et al., 2008). These studies postulate that individuals have a strong drive 
 
3 
toward consistency (Cialdini et al., 1991). On the other hand, there are studies insisting 
that after acting in a prosocial fashion, individuals are less likely to behave prosocially in 
response to a later opportunity (Monin and Miller, 2001). Usually termed licensing 
effects, these studies contend that because the initial prosocial behavior validates their 
moral identity, consumers subsequently permit or “license” themselves to engage in self-
interested, immoral, or antisocial behavior (Monin and Miller, 2001). Despite the 
ongoing efforts of examining how consumers respond to a series of requests, the extant 
research is still confined to supporting either side of arguments. Little effort has been 
made to bridge these seemingly conflicting findings. It brings up another important 
question: when and why does people’s initial prosocial behavior increase (i.e., 
consistency) or decrease (i.e., licensing) subsequent prosocial behavior?  
To addresses the above questions, this research focuses on the nature of human 
beings who make a series of ethical decisions every day. There are two philosophical 
approaches that provide deep insights into how an ethical decision is made. According to 
normative ethics, people have moral virtues that are implanted by habits (Aristotle, 
1934), and ethical behaviors are considered universal laws that can be generalized to all 
situations (Kant, 1785/1981). From this point of view, individuals engage in prosocial 
behaviors in a consistent manner because they are “good people.” On the contrary, 
behavioral ethics insists that most people make decisions at the unconscious level, and 
those are subject to heuristics and biases (Drumwright et al., 2015; Kahneman, 2011). 
Because helping others is perceived to be a socially desirable behavior, people behave 
ethically to be favorably viewed by others. Once the initial ethical behavior fulfills 
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people’s need for “being good,” however, they can easily opt out of another helping 
behavior in the subsequent stage. Implications are in that the consistency and licensing 
effects can be better explained if the following question is fully discussed: are people 
good, or just being good? 
In this research, a factor that distinguishes the consistency and licensing effects is 
investigated. Specifically, across three studies, this paper demonstrates that the increase 
and decrease in the likelihood of supporting a subsequent request are determined by 
whether consumers’ decision for initial helping behavior is made under the consideration 
of being a good person or being viewed as a good person by others. The underlying 
mechanisms are explored, and the boundary condition of the licensing effect is suggested. 
In Chapter 2, the theoretical underpinning upon which this research is based will be 
reviewed, and the hypotheses will be described and justified. Chapter 3 will layout the 
methods and present the findings of three experimental studies, and a brief discussion of 
each study will be provided. Chapter 4 will incorporate the findings again in the light of 
theoretical frameworks this research proposes. Theoretical and practical implications will 
be provided, and limitations and ideas for future research will be suggested. 
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CHAPTER 2. THEOREITCAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT 
This research draws its theoretical underpinnings from two approaches to how 
people make an ethical decision (normative ethics and behavioral ethics). Two conflicting 
findings about how consumers’ initial helping behavior impacts their subsequent helping 
behavior (consistency and licensing effects) are then reviewed. The type of social norms 
(injunctive norms and descriptive norms) are introduced as a concept that reconcile the 
conflicting findings. To shed light on the underlying mechanisms, two dimensions of 
moral identity (moral internalization and moral symbolization) are proposed and tested. A 
moral message intensifying the internal aspect of moral identity is suggested as a 
moderator that alleviates the licensing effect of descriptive norms.  
Normative Ethics 
Moral philosophy provides theoretical frameworks that enable scholars and 
marketers to analyze ethical issues in systematic, sophisticated, and nuanced ways 
(Drumwright and Murphy, 2014). As part of ethics, normative ethical inquiry seeks to 
develop judgements of right and wrong, good and bad, virtue and vice (Goodpaster, 
1982). Although there are various approaches to normative ethics, two are well known in 
the field.  
Aristotle (1934) draws on the concept of moral virtues and contends that virtuous 
people make the right decisions. From his point of view, moral virtues are not implanted 
in people by nature. Moral virtues are the result of habits instead (Aristotle, 1934; 
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Drumwright and Murphy, 2014). That is, just as people become builders by building 
houses, they become moral when they first put virtues into the action and practice them 
(e.g., “Do not lie or cheat” or “Help those in need”). The implication is that people should 
constantly engage in moral behavior because their characteristics are developed from 
those corresponding activities.  
Similarly, Kant (1785/1981) asserts that people should act such that their actions 
could be universal laws for everyone else and in every situation. He argues that these 
universal principles impose categorical imperatives meaning that an action is represented 
as necessary of itself without reference to another end. A categorical imperative is 
unconditional so one’s moral decision is not preceded by any condition such as “if I can 
have a good reputation.” As such, the categorical imperative poses the question, “Can this 
behavior be universalized?”  Moral laws take the forms of categorical imperatives, and 
these presuppose the absolute worth of all rational beings as ends in themselves. Kant 
contends that this duty-based or rule-based approach (e.g., “An individual has a rule to 
help people in need”) guides people’s moral behaviors in all situations.  
Both Aristotle’s virtue ethics and Kant’s categorical imperative present plausible 
explanations about why people sustainably engage in prosocial behavior, but these 
approaches may not explain moral actions in all situations. For instance, although people 
say they care about moral issues, their good intentions do not easily translate into their 
actual behavior (Atkinson, 2013; Atkinson and Kim, 2015; Auger and Devinney, 2007; 
Carrigan et al., 2010; d’Astous and Legendre, 2009). People even use their history of 
moral behavior to justify their incongruent and discriminatory behavior (e.g., Monin and 
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Miller, 2001). These behaviors are not consistent with Aristotle and Kant’s approaches to 
the normative ethics which assume that people are rational, capable of knowing what is 
right and capable of willing to do it (Kant, 1785/1981). Why do people sometimes act in 
an inconsistent fashion? This question is discussed in the following section.  
Behavioral Ethics 
Kahneman (2011) postulates that people easily violate the principle of 
maximizing expected utility, and most decision making is done intuitively by the 
unconscious system. In the field of ethics, a sizable amount of research has also 
documented that, in many situations, consumers’ ethical decisions are subject to 
heuristics and biases (e.g., Drumwright et al., 2015; Drumwright and Kamal, 2015; 
Prentice, 2004). Called behavioral ethics, this research focuses upon how and why good 
people, or people who do not intend to do anything wrong, make unethical decisions. 
Factors that undermine people’s ethical decision making have been identified and are 
largely categorized into three areas: cognitive errors, social and organizational pressures, 
and situational factors (Drumwright et al., 2015; Prentice, 2004).  
Cognitive errors involve a heuristic and biased process in ways that consumers 
often do not understand or even notice in their unethical decision-making. The most 
noteworthy example is moral balancing (Merrit et al., 2010). People have a moral bank 
account in their minds and sustainably engage in morally desirable and undesirable 
behavior to bring back into equilibrium (Miller and Effron, 2010). Compensation and 
licensing are both instances of balancing. When people do something bad, they then 
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actively seek an opportunity to do something good (moral compensation). When people 
do something good, they become comfortable in doing something bad (moral licensing). 
Consumers’ prior moral behavior endows them with credits that balance out subsequent 
immoral behaviors. Compensation and licensing are distinguishable in that they are 
working in different directions and rely on qualitatively different psychological 
processes.  
Whereas compensation is motivated to deploy effort to repair and compensate for 
their failure, licensing occurs when there is a conflict of motives in the target behavior 
(e.g., between self-interest and doing right things) (Mullern and Monin, 2016). The 
temptation to behave in a self-interesting manner (e.g., refuse to help) leads them to 
overestimate the morality they established through past moral behaviors (Effron, 2014) 
and change the meaning of their bad behavior as if those are not immoral and unethical at 
all (Monin and Miller, 2001). For the above reasons, many scholars have noted that 
licensing involves more complicated and biased processes than compensation (e.g., 
Effron and Monin, 2010, Merritt et al., 2010, Miller and Effron, 2010; Muller and Monin, 
2016).  
Social and organizational pressures are pertinent to consumers’ poor ethical 
choices due to their vulnerabilities to social influence. One of the most common social 
and organizational pressures is the conformity bias. The conformity bias refers to the 
tendency people have to behave like those around them rather than using their own 
personal judgment (Moscovici and Faucheux, 1972). People seem to be more 
comfortable mimicking others, even regarding ethical issues, than acting on the basis of 
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their own judgment (Drumwright and Murphy, 2014). A certain behavior of the majority 
people is considered common sense, and observers are likely to follow suit. In a word, the 
conformity bias can cause people to follow the crowd and conform to the behavior of 
others without using their own independent ethical judgment.  
As the last behavioral ethics area, situational factors include physical and 
environmental factors that affect (often adversely) ethical decision making (e.g., time 
pressure, transparency of actions, and cleanliness). Social media is an environmental 
factor that allows consumers to foster online discussions, make a connection with others, 
and create and share information in near-real time (Bortree and Seltzer, 2009; Lovejoy et 
al., 2012). This research is particularly interested in understanding how consumers’ initial 
helping behavior influences their subsequent helping behavior. In the context of 
charitable giving, the characteristics of social media (i.e., higher frequency of requests, 
the reduced time between requests, and the easiness of support for requests) suggests that 
consumers become much more susceptible to cognitive errors and social and 
organizational pressures than the offline setting.  
Based on these different approaches, the next section provides a detailed review 
of past research on how consumers’ support for an initial request brings out divergent 
outcomes for a subsequent request.   
Two Conflicting Views: Consistency vs. Licensing  
Research on moral self-regulation has convincingly indicated that one’s recent 
behavioral history is an important factor in shaping one’s current moral behavior (e.g., 
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Monin and Jordan, 2009; Zhong et al., 2009). However, two distinct and seemingly 
opposing streams of findings have been reported in the literature.  
On the one hand, there are studies demonstrating that after engaging in prosocial 
behavior, consumers are more likely to act prosocially in a later campaign (Burger and 
Caldwell, 2003; Cornelissen et al., 2008; Freedman and Fraser, 1966). These studies 
postulate that consumers have a strong drive toward consistency (Cialdini et al., 1995; 
Festinger, 1957). Initial prosocial action may highlight one’s self-concept as a moral 
individual and motivate one to act in line with this view of one’s moral self. This 
approach is compatible with the idea of virtue ethics in that virtues are essentially good 
habits and are instilled in people by practice. Because ethical values are internalized as 
character traits, virtuous people are more likely to exhibit consistency (e.g., “You care 
about people in need because you are compassionate.”). Kant (1785/1981)’s duty-based 
approach also accounts for people’s consistent patterns of moral behavior. In the form of 
categorical imperatives, as mentioned early, he insists that moral behaviors are universal 
laws of nature and should be treated as an end rather than as a means. As a result, inciting 
people to help can cause them to help more at a later stage (e.g., “I always contribute to 
worthy causes”). Many charitable organizations and advocacy groups in social media 
adopt one or two steps of participation to gain initial support from consumers. Their 
assumption appears to be if individuals first agree to a smaller request, they are more 
likely to comply with a larger request thereafter.  
On the other hand, there are studies demonstrating that after acting in a prosocial 
fashion, individuals are less likely to behave prosocially in response to a later opportunity 
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(Jordan et al., 2011; Merrit et al., 2010; Monin and Miller, 2001; Nisan, 1991). Usually 
termed licensing effects, these studies contend that the initial prosocial behavior validates 
their moral identity or provides moral credits (as in a moral bank account). People are 
then able to engage in self-interested, immoral, or antisocial behavior without damaging 
their self-concept and self-presentation as a moral person. For instance, after disagreeing 
with racist statements (Monin and Miller, 2001) or expressing a preference to vote for 
Obama (Effron et al., 2009), consumers more comfortably express a preference for hiring 
a white person over a black person for a job. In the context of prosocial behavior, prior 
research has also shown that recalling past moral actions makes individuals express lower 
prosocial intentions (Jordan et al., 2011). Choosing green products in an online store 
allows consumers to cheat more on subsequent tasks (Mazar and Zhong, 2010). 
Behavioral ethics provides the theoretical undergirding for the licensing effects. 
According to this particular point of view, most ethical decisions are not made under the 
rational actor model (Drumwright et al., 2015). Heuristics and biases largely influence 
people’s ethical decision making so they tend to gather, process, and even remember 
information in a self-serving way (e.g., Monin and Miller, 2001; Effron, 2014). Thus, in 
this research context, the licensing effects suggests that supporting an online charitable 
campaign would excuse people’s subsequent self-interest behavior. It is likely to involve 
the exaggeration of moral credentials that they established through past behavior (Effron, 
2014) and changes of the meaning of the subsequent immoral behavior as if it is not 
immoral at all (Monin and Miller, 2001). Consequently, the likelihood of supporting a 
subsequent charitable campaign would decrease.  
 
12 
The equivocal findings suggest a need for research aiming at understanding when 
and why consumer’s initial act of helping behavior does (consistency) or does not 
(licensing) lead to meaningful contributions to subsequent causes. This paper identifies 
social norms a construct that might moderate the influence of initial prosocial behavior 
on subsequent actions in the context of a fundraising campaign in social media. 
Moderating Role of Social Norms 
TWO TYPES OF SOCIAL NORMS 
Social norms are implicit social rules that regulate people’s behavior within a 
community. According to Cialdini and his colleagues (1991), social norms are best 
divided into two categories: “descriptive norms,” referring to what is commonly done by 
people in a given situation, and “injunctive norms,” conveying information regarding 
what ought to be done (Cialdini et al., 1991). For instance, in the Facebook charitable 
campaign for reuniting immigrant parents with their children, helping behavior can be 
promoted as something other people are doing (e.g., “75% of Facebook users who visited 
this page supported the cause” – descriptive norm) or as something people should be 
doing (e.g., “We should stop family separation” – injunctive norm).  
Though injunctive and descriptive norms independently and interdependently 
influence individuals’ prosocial behaviors, these two are distinguishable in several ways. 
Injunctive norms focus on an “ought,” or “standards” of behavior (Cialdini et al., 1991). 
This type of norm highlights what people feel is right based on their moral beliefs, which 
is a widely shared expectation in a social group about how people, in general, ought to act 
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in various circumstances. That is, injunctive norms would highlight superordinate and 
overarching values of behavior. In contrast, descriptive norms do not trigger the same 
value reflection. Descriptive norms focus more on the action of the group (Cialdini et al., 
1991) than the moral rules of the society. This type of norm motivates both private and 
public actions by informing individuals of what is likely to be effective or adaptive 
behavior in that situation (Cialdini et al., 1991).  
A body of research has interested in the relative effectiveness of two types of social 
norms and has consistently found descriptive norms to be a more persuasive framing for 
encouraging people’s prosocial behavior than injunctive norms (Angstrom et al., 2016; 
Cialdini, 1991; Goldstein et al., 2008). The behavior of others shapes individuals’ 
interpretations of and responses to a situation (Bearden and Etzel, 1982, Ryoo et al., 
2017). Thus, the superiority of descriptive norms over injunctive norms becomes 
prevalent especially in novel, ambiguous, or uncertain situations (Griskevicius et al., 
2006; Hochbaum, 1954; Park and Lessig, 1977; Shapiro and Neuberg, 2008).  
Of particular interest in this research is whether the impact of social norms used in 
a charitable campaign persists over time in a different charitable campaign. In this regard, 
novel predictions were made such that individuals are more (less) likely to help in the 
subsequent campaign when their initial prosocial behavior is provoked by injunctive 
norms (descriptive norms). Injunctive norms reinforce virtue and duty-based ethics, 
leading to consistency, while descriptive norms tap into consumers’ needs to be viewed 
favorably by others, so they become subject to heuristics and biases (e.g., conformity 
bias), which in turn leads to licensing. These arguments will be further elaborated in the 
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following section in which two dimensions of moral identity are introduced to explain 
why type of social norms can influence consistency and licensing effects.  
TWO DIMENSIONS OF MORAL IDENTITY AS UNDERLYING MECHANISMS 
According to Aquino and Reed (2002), moral identity has two dimensions: 
“internalization,” referring to the degree to which moral traits are central to the self, and 
“symbolization,” referring to the degree to which moral traits are reflected in the 
respondent’s actions in the world. This two-dimensional concept of moral identity is 
consistent with the self as having both an internal and external aspect (Erikson, 1964; 
Fenigstein et a., 1975), and it appeared to best represent motives for helping behavior: as 
a good person and to be a good person. Prior research has demonstrated that individuals 
have various identities and an initial task can prime a certain self-concept that influences 
the pursuit of subsequent behavior (e.g., Kahn and Dahr, 2006; Wheeler et al., 2005). In 
other words, different type of moral identity would be dominantly activated by different 
types of social norms in an initial campaign and it subsequently influences consumers’ 
decision making in response to a subsequent charitable campaign in social media. 
Moral internalization as a mechanism of the consistency effect of injunctive norms 
A person with higher moral internalization should have moral traits, goals, and 
behaviors central to the self (Aquino and Reed, 2002). If this type of moral identity 
becomes salient, individuals are more likely to engage consistently in moral actions, 
including charitable giving, because doing so enhances the consistency of their self-
concept as a moral person (Aquino and Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1984, Winterich et al., 2013). 
Otherwise, the inconsistencies between internally held attitudes and beliefs and behavior 
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would become unacceptable (Gibbons, 1990; Goukens, et al., 2009). Importantly, moral 
internalization has much in common with Aristotle and Kant’s approaches to normative 
ethics in that self-consistency is the primary driver of charitable behavior (e.g., Aristotle, 
1934; Drumwright and Murphy, 2014; Kant, 1785/1981; Winterich et al., 2013). The 
implication is that moral internalization can adequately capture one’s helping behavior is 
guided by virtue and duty-based ethics.  
As stated above, injunctive norms are found to have stable and cross-situational 
properties, be less prone to social influence, and emphasize superordinate and 
overarching values of behavior (Cialdini et al., 1991). This type of social norm is likely to 
not only elicit the moral character of the person (i.e., virtue ethics) but also enhance 
deontological (that is, duty-based) aspects of moral identity that are best judged as 
“good,” standing alone and without regard to consequences or outcomes (Aristotle, 1934; 
Drumwright and Murphy, 2014; Kant, 1785/1981). Thus, it stands to reason that if 
consumers agree to act in a prosocial fashion with injunctive norms in the initial 
campaign, they would infer that their attitude and values must be in line with prosocial 
behavior (that is, the moral internalization becomes salient), leading consumers to act in 
the same fashion later (i.e., consistency effect).   
H1a: When injunctive norms are highlighted in the initial charitable campaign, 
participants are more likely to support (e.g., willingness to support the campaign, 
engaging in electronic word-of-mouth, and actual donation) the subsequent charitable 
campaign.  
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H1b: The consistency effect of injunctive norms will be mediated by moral 
internalization.  
Moral symbolization as a mechanism of the licensing effect of injunctive norms 
As opposed to moral internalization, people with higher moral symbolization desire 
to express their moral characteristics to others through their actions in the world (Aquino 
and Reed, 2002). Because these people are eager to present themselves in a positive light 
to others, they are more sensitive to others’ comments or actions (Winterich et al., 2013). 
In line with this, research on impression management has demonstrated that people 
strategically alter their behavior to present themselves positively and are no more likely 
to provide meaningful support to those in need if their past prosocial behavior satisfies 
these impression-management concerns (Ashworth et al., 2005; Kristofferson et al., 2014; 
Sengupta et al., 2005; White and Dahl, 2007). Similarly, research has shown that if 
prosocial behavior is guided by such external motives, individuals are less likely to 
engage in subsequent prosocial behaviors (e.g., Kristofferson et al., 2014; Leary and 
Kowalsky, 1990). That is, when moral symbolization becomes salient, moral licensing 
effects are more likely to occur. Moral symbolization could properly capture the extent to 
which consumers’ helping behavior is influenced by others’ observations and evaluations 
– a key component of behavioral ethics.  
Descriptive norms are influential because this type of norm emphasizes specific and 
contextual details of how people around us behave based on more temporary properties 
(Cialdini et al., 1991, Ryoo et al., 2017). People are susceptible to how the crowd 
behaves and tend to conform their behavior to that of the majority of people (Moscovici 
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and Faucheux, 1972). Rather than focusing on their own personal moral value, 
descriptive norms make people more concerned about how much they fit in with others. 
Such social pressures would lead them to make ethical decisions in a biased manner 
(Drumwright et al., 2015). As discussed earlier, this biased process entails the 
overestimation of morality that people established through prior good deeds and enables 
them to freely do less desirable things when being asked for a subsequent request (i.e., 
moral licensing). Taken together, it is predicted that descriptive norms in the initial 
charitable campaign will activate consumers’ moral symbolization to a greater extent and 
therefore decrease their support for the subsequent campaign.  
H2a: When descriptive norms are highlighted in the initial charitable campaign, 
participants are less likely to support (e.g., willingness to support the campaign, engage 
in electronic word-of-mouth, and actual donation) the subsequent charitable campaign.  
H2b: The licensing effect of descriptive norms will be mediated by moral 
symbolization. 
THE ROLE OF A MORAL MESSAGE THAT BOLSTERS MORAL INTERNALIZATION 
So far, it has been argued that an initial act of helping behavior for a cause can 
increase or decrease subsequent support for another cause depending on the type of social 
norm. One question that arises, then, is whether there exists a way to mitigate the 
licensing effect following initial giving behavior that is prompted by descriptive norms.  
The mediating roles of two dimensions of moral identity suggest that the 
consistency effect of injunctive norms and the licensing effect of descriptive norms are 
possible via enhanced moral internalization and moral symbolization, respectively. Thus, 
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it stands to reason that the licensing effect of descriptive norms could be diminished 
when consumers have a chance to associate their initial helping behavior with internal 
aspects of moral identity.  
In this regard, this research attempts to examine the effectiveness of additional 
moral message that moderates the mediating role of moral symbolization. A condition 
will be added in which participants who respond to the descriptive norm will receive a 
moral message before they make their decision on the subsequent request. The moral 
message (e.g., “You are a person who truly cares about people in need”) represents virtue 
ethics as it has to do with the type of person one is–the virtues that she practices, which 
are part of her character (Aristotle, 1934). If the type of moral identity matters, the moral 
message that helps consumers attribute the meaning of their initial behavior to their 
central values and beliefs could mitigate the licensing effect even if consumers’ initial 
helping behavior is guided by descriptive norms. Considering that injunctive norms 
highlight the internal aspects of moral identity, consumers who makes their initial 
decision of support with injunctive norms would not be affected by the display of the 
moral message. Thus, the following hypotheses are generated.  
H3a: When moral message is not available, participants in the injunctive norms 
condition are more likely to support the subsequent campaign than those in the 
descriptive norms condition.  
H3b: When moral message is available, the likelihood of supporting the subsequent 
campaign will be not different between two social norms conditions. 
The moderating effect of moral message can be examined in a different way.  
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H4a: Participants in the descriptive norms condition are more likely to support the 
subsequent campaign when the moral message is available (vs. not available).  
H4b: Participants in the injunctive norms condition will not be influenced by the 
presence of moral message. 
Note that H4a and H4b are included in the hypotheses as the comparison between 
the conditions of moral message (available vs. not available) is an alternative way to 
capture the impact of moral message on each type of social norms.  
Examining the role of moral message is important not only because it identifies the 
boundary condition of the licensing effect of descriptive norms, but it can tease apart the 
two different processes of consistency and licensing effects. Throughout the paper, it is 
argued and demonstrated that the increased level of moral symbolization contributed to 
the licensing effect of descriptive norms, and this effect can be alleviated if an additional 
moral message shifts participants’ attention to the internal aspects of moral identity. 
Thus, the moral message is also expected to moderate the mediating role of moral 
symbolization. Given that a similar form of message will be presented, the mediating role 
of moral internalization would not be affected by the presence of moral message.  
H5a: When moral message is available, moral symbolization will not mediate the 
licensing effect of descriptive norms.  
H5b: Moral internalization will mediate the consistency effect of injunctive norms 
regardless of the presence of moral message.  
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The mediated moderation would provide additional evidence that whether 
consumers connect their initial behavior with their internal moral value is the key 
mechanism that yields consistency or licensing effects. 
Please see Figure 1 illustrating the conceptual design of the current research. The 
hypotheses of the current research are also organized in Table 1 (next page).  
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Design of the Current Research 
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Table 1. The Summary of Hypotheses  
 Hypotheses 
Study 1 & 2 
H1a: When injunctive norms are highlighted in the initial charitable 
campaign, participants are more likely to support the subsequent 
charitable campaign.  
Study 2 
H1b: The consistency effect of injunctive norms will be mediated by 
moral internalization.  
Study 1 & 2 
H2a: When descriptive norms are highlighted in the initial charitable 
campaign, participants are less likely to support the subsequent charitable 
campaign.  
Study 2 
H2b: The licensing effect of descriptive norms will be mediated by moral 
symbolization. 
Study 3 
H3a: When moral message is not available, participants in the injunctive 
norms condition are more likely to support the subsequent campaign than 
those in the descriptive norms condition. 
Study 3 
H3b: When moral message is available, the likelihood of supporting the 
subsequent campaign will be not different between two social norms 
conditions. 
Study 3 
H4a: Participants in the descriptive norms condition are more likely to 
support the subsequent campaign when the moral message is available (vs. 
not available). 
Study 3 
H4b: Participants in the injunctive norms condition will not be influenced 
by the presence of moral message. 
Study 3 
H5a: When moral message is available, moral symbolization will not 
mediate the licensing effect of descriptive norms. 
Study 3 
H5b: Moral internalization will mediate the consistency effect of 
injunctive norms regardless of the presence of moral message. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODS 
To examine the proposed hypotheses, the present research conducted three 
experiments, which were organized as follows. In Study 1, the research offered initial 
evidence that the type of social norms is the determinant of consistency or licensing 
effects. In Study 2, the underlying mechanisms were explored by investigating whether 
two dimensions of moral identity mediate the social norm effect. Study 2 also attempted 
to capture participants’ actual donation behavior. In Study 1 and 2, social norms were 
manipulated using Facebook’s fundraisers while different causes were employed between 
two studies. Study 3 further extended the scope of this research by demonstrating that the 
presence of a moral message bolstering internal aspects of moral identity can mitigate the 
licensing effect of descriptive norms. A fictitious online charitable giving website was 
created, and social norms and the moral message were manipulated in the form of pop-up 
messages. Note that the procedure of the studies is illustrated in Figure 2 (next page) and 
the findings are summarized in Table 2 (p. 58).  
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First Session                                               Second Session 
(expected)                                                    (unexpected) 
 
Figure 2. Procedure of Studies 
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Study 1 
Study 1 aimed to provide preliminary evidence that the type of social norms is a 
key factor that determines whether consumers’ initial prosocial behavior facilitates or 
hinders their subsequent prosocial behavior in the context of charitable giving on 
Facebook.  
PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE 
Participants  
 A total of 114 participants (Mage = 39.05, 68 Female) were recruited from 
Amazon’s MTurk and were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (injunctive 
norms, descriptive norms, or control condition). A baseline condition with a neutral 
initial behavior was included as it is important to distinguish whether licensing or 
compensation or both occurred (Mullen and Monin, 2016). Participants were paid 50 
cents for their participation. The number of participants was calculated on the basis of the 
power analysis using the G*Power program. MTurk has been shown to be a valid and 
reliable source for online data collection (Buhrmester et al., 2011). Considering that this 
study aimed to better understand consumers’ responses to a series of charitable giving 
campaigns in social media, using an online-panel particularly seemed proper in this 
research context.  
Stimuli development  
 For the experiment, two main Facebook pages were created for two causes: 
“Helping underprivileged children” and “Helping homeless people.” Facebook’s 
fundraising page was selected as a social media platform with the following reasons. 
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Non-profits reported that Facebook is the most important social media for their causes 
and 42% of social marketers have claimed that Facebook is critical or important to their 
business (The Non Profit Times, 2018). As mentioned earlier, more than 750,000 
nonprofits have used Facebook’s fundraiser service, and millions of dollars are going to 
charities through it (Facebook, 2018). Thus, Facebook’s fundraising page was considered 
an appropriate social networking platform in this research context. The issues of 
underprivileged children and homeless people were selected as the focus of this study 
because the two commonly addressed top four most discussed issues in the prosocial 
sector: public and societal benefit, human service, education, and health (The Non Profit 
Times, 2018). As shown in Appendix A, the layout of these two Facebook fundraisers 
remained the same, but they contained different written and graphical content to describe 
respective socially responsible issues.  
 In a pretest, participants (N = 60, Mage = 39.65 years, 23 Female, recruited from 
MTurk) were shown either of two causes and reported that the two did not significantly 
differ in terms of believability (Mchildren = 5.57 vs. Mhomeless = 5.43; p > .1), interest 
(Mchildren = 5.13 vs. Mhomeless = 5.03; p > .1), trustworthiness (Mchildren = 5.17 vs. Mhomeless = 
5.37; p > .1), or writing quality (Mchildren = 5.6 vs. Mhomeless = 5.23; p > .1). Each was 
measured with a single item on a seven-point semantic scale (e.g., 1 = Unbelievable, 7 = 
Believable). The importance of the two causes was also measured using a 2-item scale for 
each campaign: (1) “To what extent do you think ‘Helping homeless people 
(underprivileged children)’ is an important issue in our society?” and (2) “To what extent 
do you think ‘homeless (underprivileged children)’ are people in need?” (r = .89) on a 
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seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = Not at all, 7 = A great deal) and found no significant 
difference between the two causes (Mchildren = 5.84 vs. Mhomeless = 6.01; p > .1). The results 
of pretest ensured the appropriateness of the two topics of campaigns for a social norms 
intervention.  
 Because this research intended to examine how participants’ initial prosocial 
decision-making influences their subsequent decision-making and how the type of social 
norms differentiates this effect, the manipulations of the type of social norms were made 
only for the initial campaign; no treatment was employed in the subsequent campaign. 
Specifically, for those in the injunctive norms condition, both the graphical content and 
descriptions of Facebook fundraising pages were read “It is our responsibility to help 
underprivileged children (homeless people)” whereas “…75% of people who visited this 
page help underprivileged children (homeless people)” was used for those in the 
descriptive norms condition (See Appendix B). The manipulations of these two types of 
social norms were in line with prior studies (Cialdini et al., 1991; Ryoo et al., 2017).  
 Another pretest (N = 122, Mage = 39.37 years, 54 Female, recruited from MTurk) 
was conducted to determine whether the manipulated social norms messages influenced 
the normative belief of the target audience. This pretest was conducted with a separate 
sample from that of the previous pretest as social norms may have a confounding effect 
on participants’ responses to believability, interest, trustworthiness, and quality of content 
and the importance of issue. Participants were shown one of two Facebook pages which 
was manipulated either injunctive or descriptive norms and measured the perception of 
two social norms delineated in the Facebook page, using a 4-item scale (e.g., “The 
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information presented in the Facebook page indicated that most people who visited this 
campaign page helped underprivileged children (homeless people)” and “The information 
presented in the Facebook page indicated that helping underprivileged children (homeless 
people) is what we ought to do”) on a seven-point Likert-type scale (e.g., 1 = Strongly 
disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). First (last) two items were averaged to create the index of 
descriptive (injunctive) norms (r = .93 and r = .96, respectively; explained variance = 
80.8%). After then, participants responded to two questions regarding the normative 
belief, using a 2-item scale: “I think that most people who visited this campaign page 
helped underprivileged children (homeless people),” “I think helping underprivileged 
children (homeless people) is our responsibility.” All questions were modified from a 
work by Lapinski et al. (2013) and were measured on a seven-point Likert-type scale 
(e.g., 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree).  
 The results of second pretest showed that participants perceived the Facebook 
page of descriptive norms to describe a high prevalence of helping behavior among 
people (Underprivileged children: Mdescriptive = 6.03 vs. Minjunctive = 4.58; p < .001; 
Homeless people: Mdescriptive = 5.92 vs. Minjunctive = 3.57; p < .001), whereas they perceived 
the Facebook page of injunctive norms to indicate helping behaviors are what we ought 
to do (Underprivileged children: Mdescriptive = 3.67 vs. Minjunctive = 5.83; p < .001; Homeless 
people: Mdescriptive = 2.94 vs. Minjunctive = 4.94; p < .001). Participants also thought that 
most people supported the campaign after viewing the Facebook page of descriptive 
norms (Underprivileged children: Mdescriptive = 5.97 vs. Minjunctive = 4.13; p < .001; 
Homeless people: Mdescriptive = 5.63 vs. Minjunctive = 3.97; p < .01), whereas they thought 
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helping others are our responsibility after seeing the Facebook page of injunctive norms 
(Underprivileged children: Mdescriptive = 3.53 vs. Minjunctive = 5.3; p < .001; Homeless 
people: Mdescriptive = 2.97 vs. Minjunctive = 5.35; p < .001). The results confirmed that two 
types of social norms were manipulated appropriately in Facebook pages, and 
participants’ normative beliefs were distinctively influenced by the embedded moral 
message.  
Procedure  
 Upon agreeing to participate in the experiment, participants of the main 
experiment read instructions saying that a recently formed charitable organization named 
“We Support” is requesting feedback regarding the effectiveness of their online 
communication tool—a fundraiser on Facebook. Participants were told that they will 
evaluate just one campaign in the study. They then viewed either type of social norms as 
an initial campaign without knowing another cause would follow.  
 It was critical that participants did not expect another request for a charitable 
donation. For the licensing effect to occur, there had to be a conflict of motives in 
response to the subsequent request for a donation (Mullen and Monin, 2012). Because the 
subsequent campaign was not expected, participants might want to do something 
personally beneficial (e.g., refuse to help), but they might be torn by a conflicting motive 
(e.g., doing the right thing). In this case, the fact that they had already engaged in helping 
behavior might license them to yield to temptation, which could lead to a decrease in 
support for the subsequent campaign. The assumption was that individuals pursue 
multiple, somethings conflicting goals (Kahn and Dahr, 2006; Wheeler et al., 2005). The 
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unexpected asking was also important for the consistency effect as it functioned to 
distinguish whether participants’ persistent prosocial behavior was due to their 
dispositional characteristics (as a moral person) or the effect of social norms. The sudden 
asking would make participants more susceptible to normative information. As they 
would think more of what the prior helping behavior meant to be with the presence of 
injunctive norms, there would be no room for a conflicting motive. The prior behavior 
would bolster the notion of virtue ethics and they were therefore more likely to comply 
with the later campaign. Note that the presentation of the two causes in the initial and 
subsequent campaigns was counterbalanced to eliminate the order effect. 
 After viewing the initial campaign at a self-paced rate, participants in the 
injunctive and descriptive norms conditions were asked if they would be willing to 
donate their money to the campaign (i.e., Yes or No). To enhance their moral footprint, 
participants who agreed on donating their money were thanked for their donation before 
proceeding to the second session; those who expressed their disinterest in the initial 
campaign (i.e., answered ‘No’) were directed to the end page of the experiment. 
Participants in the control condition were neither shown any of social norm messages in 
the initial campaign nor received the donation question. Instead, they reported how 
believable, interesting, trustworthy, and well-written the initial campaign is. In other 
words, the first campaign they saw was neutral, and it did not make reference to a moral 
dimension. 
Before being exposed to a second Facebook page for another charitable giving 
campaign, all participants were asked to complete an animal crossword puzzle as a filler 
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task (Carney and Levin, 2003; See Appendix C) which they spent about three minutes to 
complete. The animal crossword puzzle was a widely used filler task in psychology to 
disguise the true purpose of the study. Upon completion of the filler task, all participants 
were shown another campaign. Note again that participants did not expect the second 
campaign. Because the order of the two campaigns was counterbalanced, participants 
who had initially been presented with the campaign for helping underprivileged children 
(homeless people) subsequently viewed the campaign for helping homeless people 
(underprivileged children). The subsequent campaign did not contain any normative 
information. Exploration of the website was self-paced.  
After viewing the second campaign, all participants answered questions concerning 
their willingness to support the campaign (WTS) with a 3-item scale (e.g., “How likely 
are you to support this cause?; M = 4.23, SD = 1.78, α = .93; White and Peloza, 2009) 
and the willingness to engage in electronic word-of-mouth on online social sites (eWOM) 
with a 4-item scale (e.g., “To what extent is it likely that you will say positive things 
about this cause on social sites such as Facebook?; M = 4.18, SD = 1.89, α = .96; 
Eisingerich et al., 2015). All the above scales were measured on a seven-point Likert-type 
scale (e.g., 1 = Extremely unlikely, 7 = Extremely likely). See Appendix D for details of 
the items. WTS and eWOM were worth exploring as they properly captured participants’ 
general and specific forms of helping behavior, respectively. The consistent patterns 
between the two dependent variables would ensure that the conceptual design of this 
research sufficiently addressed not only how participants reacted to the “given” requests 
but also how likely they were willing to be an “active messenger” in social media. 
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After completing WTS and eWOM for the subsequent campaign, participants in 
injunctive and descriptive norms conditions reported how believable (M = 5.26, SD = 
1.62), interesting (M = 4.97, SD = 1.71), trustworthy (M = 4.92, SD = 1.74), and well-
written (M = 5.23, SD = 1.54) the two campaigns were. The importance of the issues (M 
= 6.03, SD = 1.22, α = .89) was also measured, using the items used in the pretest. After 
then, participants indicated their perceptions of the moral message shown in the 
Facebook pages as the manipulation check, using a 4-item scale used in the pretest 
(Descriptive: M = 4.51, SD = 1.87, α = .9 and Injunctive: M = 4.5, SD = 1.69, α = .91; 
explained variance = 85.5%). People use normative information as a heuristic guide to 
behavior (Cialdini, 2007) and research on information processing suggested that the 
degree to which people process information is highly dependent on their involvement 
with the issue (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Petty and Cacioppo, 1979). To control the 
involvement with helping behavior, all participants reported their history of helping 
behavior by responding to the following questions: “How frequently do you typically 
help people in need?,” “How often do you give to charitable organizations?,” and “How 
often do you volunteer for charitable organizations?” (M = 4.44, SD = 1.51, α = .86) on a 
seven-point Likert-type scale (e.g., 1 = Very infrequently, 7 = Very frequently). At the 
end of the study, participants completed demographic measures and were thanked.  
RESULTS  
The results showed that the fundraising requests for the two causes (i.e., Helping 
underprivileged children and helping homeless people) were not significantly different in 
terms of believability (Mchildren = 5.33 vs. Mhomeless = 5.18; p > .1), interest (Mchildren = 4.95 
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vs. Mhomeless = 4.99; p > .1), trustworthiness (Mchildren = 4.94 vs. Mhomeless = 4.9; p > .1), and 
writing quality (Mchildren = 5.25 vs. Mhomeless = 5.2; p > .1). The cause of underprivileged 
children (M = 6.02) was also not perceived to be socially more important than the cause 
of homeless people (M = 6.01, p > .1). The results of manipulation check for two types of 
social norms revealed that participants saw the Facebook page of descriptive norms was 
more likely to delineate what the majority of people have done (M = 5.89) rather than 
what ought to be done (M = 3.25, p < .001) whereas the Facebook page of injunctive 
norms was more likely to indicate what ought to be done (M = 5.9) rather than what the 
majority of people have done (M = 2.96, p < .001). Thus, the selection of causes and the 
manipulation of two types of social norms were appropriate and effective.  
Concerning the initial campaign, 47.37% (38 out of 76) participants in both social 
norms conditions reported their intention to donate the money. The logistic regression 
analysis revealed that participants in the descriptive norms condition (60%, 24 out of 40) 
were more likely to donate money than those in the injunctive norms condition (38.89%, 
14 out of 36) at a marginal level (rϕ = .044, χ2 = 3.404, p = .068).  
A MANCOVA was performed to examine whether two types of social norms 
facilitated or hindered consumers’ willingness to support the campaign (WTS) and their 
engagement in electronic word-of-mouth on online social sites (eWOM) for a following 
cause, using the involvement with helping behavior as a covariate. As mentioned early, 
those who indicated their unwillingness to donate money for the initial cause were 
excluded from the data. After controlling for the involvement with helping behavior 
(WTS: F(1, 71) = 7.758, p < .01; eWOM: F(1, 71) = 22.039, p < .001), the results 
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revealed a significant main effect on WTS (F(2, 71) = 4.394, p < .05) and eWOM (F(2, 
71) = 9.34, p < .001). A series of pairwise comparisons were subsequently performed to 
clarify the relationship between these three groups (injunctive norms, descriptive norms, 
and control condition). As shown in Figure 3 (next page), participants in the injunctive 
norms condition showed significantly higher WTS (M = 5.5, SD = 1.11) and eWOM (M 
= 5.86, SD = 1.23) than those in the control condition (WTS: M = 4.5, SD = 1.22, F(1, 
48) = 4.66, p < .05; eWOM: M = 4.46, SD = 1.23, F(1, 48) = 10.61, p < .01), while 
participant in the descriptive norms condition reported lower WTS (M = 3.81, SD = 1.86) 
and eWOM (M = 3.49, SD = 1.94) than those in the control group (WTS: F(1, 58) = 2.82, 
p = .09; eWOM: F(1, 58) = 5.83, p < .05) at a marginally significant and significant level, 
respectively. Obviously, there were also significant differences between participants in 
the injunctive norms condition and the descriptive norms condition in terms of WTS 
(F(1, 35) = 5.62, p < .05) and eWOM (F(1, 35) = 2.75, p < .01). Thus, H1a and H2a were 
supported.  
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Figure 3. Differences between Injunctive Norms, Descriptive Norms, and Control Group 
on Willingness to Support (WTS) and Electronic Word-Of-Mouth (eWOM) 
for the Subsequent Campaign (Note: Involvement with helping behavior 
was included in the model as a covariate) 
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DISCUSSION IN BRIEF 
The results of Study 1 supported the basic prediction that the type of social norms 
determines consistency and licensing effects. After controlling for the involvement of 
helping behavior, consumers persistently helped others in a later stage (i.e., consistency 
effect) when their initial prosocial behavior was performed under the consideration of 
what ought to be done (injunctive norms). However, in the case that consumers’ initial 
prosocial behavior was triggered by the information about how many people have done 
(descriptive norms), they refused to help others in response to a subsequent campaign 
(i.e., licensing).  
Study 1 found the boundary condition of the superiority of descriptive norms over 
injunctive norms. Descriptive norms were found to be less effective in encouraging 
consumers to behave ethically in a later campaign than injunctive norms despite their 
greater effectiveness in an initial campaign. This advanced the prior studies such that the 
superiority of descriptive norms over injunctive norms may be limited to an isolated and 
single charitable giving campaign. In a longer time frame, injunctive norms may have 
greater impacts on consumers’ prosocial behavior than descriptive norms.  
Despite its meaningful findings, there were limitations in Study 1. More than half 
of the participants who were not interested in donating money to the initial campaign 
were eliminated. Our focus on those who had prior experience of helping behavior was 
advantageous in elucidating which type of social norms led to consistency or licensing 
effect in the subsequent campaign. However, the exclusion of part of the sample in the 
first session resulted in the imbalance of sample size between three conditions (14 for 
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injunctive norms, 24 for descriptive norms, and 37 for control conditions). The imbalance 
and relatively small sample size likely contributed to some of the marginally significant 
outcomes in Study 1. A different experimental design was employed in Study 2 to 
address this shortcoming.  
Study 2 
The primary goal of Study 2 was to explore underlying psychological processes 
that account for the consistency and licensing effects. As described earlier, this research 
posited that injunctive and descriptive norms would tap into different aspects of moral 
identity (moral internalization and moral symbolization, respectively), and subsequently 
lead to an increase or a decline in their prosocial behavior for the following request (H1b 
and H2b). To test these predictions, Aquino and Reed’s (2002) Self-Importance of Moral 
Identity Scale was implemented and the mediation analysis was conducted. Study 2 also 
attempted to enhance the generalizability of the current research in two ways: 1) 
employing a different charitable giving context and 2) capturing participants’ actual 
behavior instead of measuring their willingness to support the campaign.  
PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE 
A total of 120 participants (Mage = 42.85 years, 73 Female) were recruited from 
Amazon’s MTurk and were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (injunctive 
norms, descriptive norms, or control condition). The procedure and measures were in 
keeping with those used in Study 1 with the following exceptions.  
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First, as a new cause, “Helping people with disabilities” was employed (See 
Appendix E). A pretest (N = 57, Mage = 36.28 years, 29 Female, recruited from MTurk) 
confirmed that the Facebook page of “Helping people with disabilities” was not 
significantly different from that of “Helping underprivileged children” in terms of 
believability (Mchildren = 5.45 vs. Mdisabilities = 5.89; p > .1), interest (Mchildren = 5.31 vs. 
Mdisabilities = 5.54; p > .1), trustworthiness (Mchildren = 5.1 vs. Mdisabilities = 5.54; p > .1), 
quality (Mchildren = 5.14 vs. Mdisabilities = 5.36; p > .1), and the importance of the cause 
(Mchildren = 5.89 vs. Mdisabilities = 5.91; p > .1). In Study 1, the cause of homeless people was 
not significantly different on these measures from the cause of underprivileged children. 
Thus, it was assumed that the three causes used in this research seemed appropriate and 
was not uniquely influencing the results. Consistent with Study 1, the order of the 
presentation of the two campaigns was counterbalanced, and the manipulation of social 
norms was implemented only into the initial campaign.  
Second, rather than indicating whether participants would be willing to donate their 
money to the ‘initial’ campaign (i.e., Yes or No), participants in injunctive and 
descriptive norms conditions (not participants in the control condition) were asked to 
indicate how much money they are willing to donate on a scale ranging from $0 to $10. 
To prevent the ceiling and floor effects, $5 was indicated as a reference point of the scale 
in which participants can determine they would donate more or less. This measurement of 
a continuous variable prevented a large part of data from being eliminated after the first 
session.  
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Third, after reporting the extent to which they were willing to donate for the initial 
campaign, all participants completed Aquino and Reed’s (2002) Self-Importance of 
Moral Identity Scale. This measure consisted of a 10-item scale reflecting two 
conceptually distinctive dimensions of moral identity (moral internalization and moral 
symbolization) and was known to be internally consistent, had significant test-retest 
reliability, and had strong predictive validity for various types of moral cognition and 
behavior (Aquino and Reed, 2002; Reynolds and Ceranic, 2007; Winterich et al., 2009). 
Even if this scale has largely been used for measuring an individual’s moral identity 
traits, prior research demonstrated that priming techniques can make a certain self-
concept dominant over another temporally, and the dominant self-concept subsequently 
influences the individual’s cognition and behaviors (e.g., Winterich et al., 2013). In this 
light, different types of social norms were expected to make a particular dimension of 
moral identity more salient and therefore had an effect on participants’ responses to 
subsequent requests. 
Lastly, instead of measuring participants’ willingness to support the subsequent 
campaign (WTS), participants were directly asked to indicate whether they would donate 
their participation compensation (50 cents) to the “WeSupport” (i.e., Yes or No). To 
enhance realism, participants were told that 50 cents will be automatically deducted from 
the reward for participating in the study (see Appendix D for the detailed descriptions). 
At the end of the study, participants indicated the extent to which they believed the 
donation was real and then were told that this question was set for experiment purposes 
and would not affect the compensation. To prevent the case that the possibly low rate of 
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actual giving may negatively impact the eWOM, the measure of eWOM preceded the 
measure of actual donation on a separate page.  
RESULTS  
The results of manipulation checks showed that believability (Mchildren = 5.57 vs. 
Mdisabilities = 5.63; p > .1), interest (Mchildren = 4.9 vs. Mdisabilities = 5.13; p > .1), 
trustworthiness (Mchildren = 5.14 vs. Mdisabilities = 5.27; p > .1), writing quality (Mchildren = 
5.29 vs. Mdisabilities = 5.39; p > .1), and importance (Mchildren = 5.14 vs. Mdisabilities = 5.27; p > 
.1) were not significantly different between the causes of helping people with disabilities 
and helping underprivileged children. The Facebook page of descriptive norms was 
perceived to illustrate what the majority of people have done (M = 5.76) rather than what 
ought to be done (M = 4.04, p < .001) whereas the Facebook page of injunctive norms 
was thought to indicate what ought to be done (M = 5.92) rather than what the majority of 
people have done (M = 3.73, p < .001). Thus, the use of two causes and social norms 
manipulations were suitable and effective. Furthermore, a principal component analysis 
(varimax rotation) was conducted and found that the 10-item scale measuring moral 
identity was categorized into two factors: five ‘internalization’ items (M = 5.52, SD = 
1.36, α = .9) and five ‘symbolization’ items (M = 4.33, SD = 1.62, α = .91; explained 
variance = 75.85%).  
Donation to the initial campaign 
The results of an ANCOVA, using the involvement with helping behavior as a 
covariate (p < .05), revealed that there was a significant difference between injunctive 
and descriptive norms conditions in terms of participants’ willingness to donate money to 
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the initial campaign (F(1, 77) = 4.76, p < .05). Specifically, participants in the descriptive 
norms (M = 5.07, SD = 3.19) indicated that they were more likely to donate money to the 
initial campaign than those in the injunctive norms condition (M = 3.1, SD = 3.02). This 
was aligned with prior research such that descriptive norms are more effective in 
encouraging consumers to engage in prosocial behavior than injunctive norms.  
Electronic word-of-mouth on online social sites (eWOM) for the subsequent 
campaign 
An ANCOVA was first performed to examine whether two types of social norms in 
the initial campaign had differential effects on participants’ engagement in electronic 
word-of-mouth on online social sites (eWOM) for the subsequent campaign, using the 
involvement with helping behavior as a covariate. Those who had indicated $0 
contribution for the initial campaign (N = 24) were not included in the analysis, leaving 
96 participants. Because these participants had received the donation question about the 
manipulated initial campaign, they were qualitatively different from those in the control 
group. Strictly speaking, they had experience of denying engaging in prosocial behavior, 
which is out of the scope of the current research.  
After controlling for the involvement with helping behavior (p < .001), a significant 
main effect of three conditions on eWOM was found (F(2, 92) = 30.14, p < .001). The 
pairwise comparisons revealed that participants in the injunctive norms condition 
reported a marginally higher eWOM (M = 5.48, SD = .96) than those in the control 
condition (M = 4.78, SD = 1.5, F(1, 60) = 3.66, p < .05), while participant in the 
descriptive norms condition indicated a significantly lower eWOM (M = 3.15, SD = 1.01) 
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than those in the control group (F(1, 67) = 25.7, p < .001). The differences between the 
injunctive and the descriptive norms conditions were also significant (p < .001). Thus, 
H1a and H2a were supported again.  
The mediating effects of moral internalization and moral symbolization on eWOM 
were tested, using Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) PROCESS macro (Model 4). Only two 
types of social norms were included in the mediation analysis for the following two 
reasons. First, the dominance of a particular moral identity would be determined by 
whether participants were presented with injunctive norms or descriptive norms. Thus, 
the comparison between two types of social norms would more clearly demonstrate the 
mediating effects of two moral identities. Second, even if it appeared to be a critical 
confounding variable, the extent to which participants donate money to the initial 
campaign was not successfully controlled for in the previous analysis. As participants in 
the control group did not respond to the donation question about the initial campaign, and 
they were considered missing data when the control group was included in the model. To 
effectively demonstrate the mediating roles of two types of moral identities and minimize 
the confounding effect of the prior donation, thus, the two types of social norms were 
used as an independent variable (-1 = injunctive norms, 1 = descriptive norms). Two 
dimensions of moral identity, involvement with helping behavior and prior donation, 
were mean-centered and were entered in the model as mediators and covariates.  
As shown in Figure 4 (next page), the results showed a significant indirect effect of 
social norms on eWOM through moral internalization (β = -.29, 95% CI -.52 to -.04). 
Specifically, injunctive norms (vs. descriptive norms) in the initial campaign yielded 
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significantly higher levels of moral internalization (β = -1.02, CI -1.33 to -.72), which 
then led to a significant increase in eWOM of the subsequent campaign (β = .28, 95%, CI 
.05 to .51), supporting H1b. A significant indirect effect of social norms on eWOM 
through moral symbolization (β = -.36, 95% CI -.67 to -.11) was also found. In detail, 
descriptive norms (vs. injunctive norms) in the initial campaign activated significantly 
higher levels of moral symbolization (β = 1.08, CI .78 to 1.37), which resulted in a 
significant decline in eWOM of the subsequent campaign (β = -.34, CI -.47 to -.11). 
Thus, H2b was supported.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Mediating Effects of Moral Internalization and Moral Symbolization on 
Electronic Word-Of-Mouth (eWOM) (Note: * means the regression 
coefficient is significant at least the p < .05 level. Involvement with helping 
behavior and prior donation were included in the model as covariates) 
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Actual donation to the subsequent campaign  
Only 13% of participants (13 out of 96) indicated that they were willing to make an 
actual donation to the subsequent campaign. Due to the low rate of response, no 
significant differences were found among the three conditions: injunctive norms (19.2%, 
5 out of 26), descriptive norms (12.1% 4 out of 33), and control group (10.8%, 4 out of 
37). This issue will be further discussed in the next section. The results were not changed 
even after controlling for the believability of actual donation (M = 4.66, SD = 2.05).  
DISCUSSION IN BRIEF 
Study 2 provided cumulative evidence that the type of social norms presented in the 
initial campaign was a key construct that facilitates or hinders consumers’ subsequent 
prosocial behavior. When the prior campaign highlighted injunctive norms, they were 
more willing to engage in electronic word-of-mouth on online social sites (eWOM) 
compared to those in the control condition. On the contrary, when the initial campaign 
emphasized descriptive norms, they were less likely to engage in electronic word-of-
mouth on online social sites (eWOM) compared to those in the control condition. A new 
cause (“Helping people with disabilities”) was employed and the consistent findings with 
Study 1 were obtained in Study 2, suggesting that the conceptual design of the current 
research was robust and applicable to other prosocial issues.  
Study 2 also demonstrated the mediating effect of moral identity. In comparison to 
the descriptive norms (injunctive norms), injunctive norms (descriptive norms) also 
reported higher (lower) eWOM for the subsequent campaign. Importantly, the 
consistency effect of injunctive norms was mediated by moral internalization, while the 
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licensing effect of descriptive norms was mediated by moral symbolization. This 
suggested that the consistency and licensing effects were derived from their motives to be 
consistent with the internal part of the moral self-concept and to project a favorable 
aspect of moral identity to others through actions in the world, respectively. Thus, Study 
2 showed that different types of social norms made a particular dimension of moral 
identity more salient and therefore had an effect on participants’ responses to subsequent 
requests.  
 Study 2 attempted to capture consumers’ actual donation, but no significant 
differences among the three conditions (injunctive, descriptive, and control) were found. 
The statistically insignificant result was possibly due to the low rate of actual donation. A 
large body of research has already noted that consumers’ favorable attitude toward the 
prosocial issue often fails to predict their actual helping behavior (Atkinson, 2013; 
Atkinson and Kim, 2015; Auger and Devinney, 2007; Carrigan et al., 2010; d’Astous and 
Legendre, 2009). Consumers are generally skeptical of how authentic the organization’s 
concern is about the causes they promote (Forehand and Grier, 2003; Skarmeas and 
Leonidou, 2013; Webb and Mohr, 1998). In addition, actual donation involves multi-
attribute decision making that considers several factors, such as whether their donation 
goes directly to recipients and whether their donation can have an actual effect. However, 
this study did not specify any information about nonprofit organizations that were 
soliciting donations in order to minimize potential confounding effects and rule out 
alternative explanations. Thus, the lack of detailed information appeared to contribute to 
the insignificant results. The moderate levels of the believability of actual donation (M = 
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4.66, SD = 2.05) supported this argument. Nevertheless, 13% of actual donation was 
believed to be meaningful considering that only 1.1% of website visitors donated in 
reality (The Non Profit Times, 2018). This issue will be further discussed in the limitation 
and future research section of the general discussion.   
It was worth discussing the ways of hypothesis testing. Mullen and Monin (2016) 
noted that researchers cannot distinguish the contribution of licensing and compensation 
in the absence of a baseline. In this light, this paper tested the hypotheses by comparing 
differences occurred in the subsequent campaign between each social norm condition and 
the control condition. This analysis was idealistic when the initial helping behavior was 
measured with a discrete variable (whether they helped or not). However, the extent to 
which consumers engaged in an initial helping behavior appeared to be an important 
factor influencing their response to subsequent requests. Advancing the previous 
research, thus, Study 2 used the measurement of a continuous variable for the initial 
helping behavior on the scale ranging from donations of $0 to $10. This approach was 
expected not only to prevent part of data from being excluded in the data analysis process 
but also to allow researchers to account for the degrees of prior helping behavior. 
Nevertheless, this approach also entailed a problem. The statistics recognized the control 
condition as missing data due to the lack of their response to the initial helping behavior. 
The variance of the initial helping behavior was not accountable when the control 
condition entered the model.  
Alternative ways of analyzing data were proposed as follows: 1) focusing on the 
difference of helping behavior between two types of social norms in the subsequent 
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campaign after controlling for the degree of initial helping behavior, as we did in the 
mediating tests, and 2) focusing on the difference in the change of participants’ helping 
behaviors observed in the stream of initial and subsequent campaigns. Even if the first 
way appeared to be the simplest and most effective way to differentiate the consistency 
and licensing effects, controlling for the variance of participants’ initial donation could 
diminish (or blur) the distinctive effects of two types of social norms on the subsequent 
campaign. In this regard, the second one was worth testing. If injunctive (descriptive) 
norms of the initial campaign lead to the consistency (licensing) effect, participants 
would exhibit increased (decreased) intentions to support the subsequent campaign 
compared to the initial campaign. In this case, people’s initial helping behavior in each 
type of social norms is considered a true baseline and there will be significant differences 
between two types of social norms in the degree of response changes. In other words, 
keeping track of reactions to the initial and subsequent campaign could provide direct 
evidence about whether social norms are a factor bridging the gap between the 
consistency or licensing effects without the control condition. To gain a complete 
understanding of the role of social norms, the second way of analyzing data was 
implemented in the next study.  
Study 3 
The main goal of Study 3 was to test the hypothesis that providing a moral message 
intensifying the internal aspect of moral identity can mitigate the licensing effect of 
descriptive norms. The reasoning is that the moral message would redirect the focus of 
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participants in the descriptive norms condition to the superordinate meaning of the 
helping behavior (i.e., virtue ethic) and this, in turn, could lessen the licensing effect. 
Study 3 also aimed to provide more direct evidence for the consistency and licensing 
effects by taking into account the change of individual consumer’s helping behaviors 
between initial and subsequent campaigns. The same measurements were used in both 
campaigns to tease out the influence of social norms. A different way of social norms 
manipulation was implemented in a different online platform (Pop-up messages in a 
charitable organization’s website) to maximize the experimental realism.  
PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE 
Experimental design and sample 
A 2 (Social norms of the initial campaign: Injunctive vs. Descriptive) × 2 (Moral 
message: Yes vs. No) between-subjects design was employed. A total of 160 participants 
(Mage = 40.44 years, 85 Female) were recruited from Amazon’s MTurk and were 
randomly assigned to four conditions. The control condition was not included in Study 3. 
Stimuli development 
For the experiment, two main webpages of a fictitious charitable organization 
named “Support.org” were created for two causes used in Study 1: “Helping 
underprivileged children” and “Helping homeless people.” As shown in Appendix F, the 
layout of these webpages was kept the same, but they contained different written and 
graphical content to describe these two different campaigns. In reality, a series of calls for 
help are often made by several requesters. To enhance the realism of the experiment, 
neutral names of two authors were used for the two campaigns (“Mary Rubin” for the 
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underprivileged children campaign and “Paul Smith” for the homeless people campaign). 
A pretest1 (N = 55, Mage = 41.18 years, 33 female) confirmed that the two campaigns did 
not significantly differ in terms of believability (Mchildren = 5.47 vs. Mhomeless  = 5.58; p > 
.1), interest (Mchildren = 5.13 vs. Mhomeless  = 5.29; p > .1), trustworthiness (Mchildren = 5.38 
vs. Mhomeless  = 5.35; p > .1), or quality (Mchildren = 5.18 vs. Mhomeless  = 5.15; p > .1). The 
importance of two causes were not found to be significant different (Mchildren = 5.78 vs. 
Mhomeless = 5.65; p > .1). For the name of the requesters, participants in the pretest also 
measured the extent to which the given names are common, ordinary, and usual on a 
seven-point semantic scale (e.g., 1 = Uncommon, 7 = Common). The results of the 
pretest revealed that two requesters’ names were not significantly different in this regard 
(MMary = 6.12 vs. MPaul = 6.16; p > .1).  
The moral message was manipulated in the form of a popup message, saying 
“…You are a person who truly cares about people in need” (See Appendix H). The 
effectiveness of this moral message was demonstrated as part of the pretest stated above. 
As a different session of the study, participants in the pretest were first asked to recall “a 
time when you did something ethical in a work or professional setting (Jordan et al., 
2011).” After reporting their ethical behavior, only half of the participants were presented 
with the moral message whereas the rest of them did not receive this message. All 
participants then proceeded to complete the moral identity scale (Aquino and Reed, 
2002). It was predicted that reading the moral message would lead participants to have a 
 
1 Even if the two causes were confirmed in Study 1, another pretest was conducted in 
Study 3 to resolve a concern that the use of a different online platform and the different 
requesters may have confounding effects.   
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stronger tendency toward placing the internal aspects of moral identity in the center of 
self-concept than those who did not read such a message. The results showed that 
participants who had the moral message (M = 6.11, SD = .70) reported higher levels of 
moral internalization scores than those who did not receive the moral message (M = 5.57, 
SD = 1.15; t(53) = -2.105, p < .05), meaning that the exposure to the moral message can 
effectively increase the moral internalization among people2. The results also revealed 
that there was no significant difference in the moral symbolization scores regardless of 
whether participants read the moral message (M = 4.63, SD = 1.12) or not (M = 4.46, SD 
= 1.54; p > .1). This suggested that the manipulated moral message uniquely influenced 
participants’ internal moral identity.  
Procedure 
In keeping with actual charitable campaigns online, participants followed several 
steps to indicate the likelihood of supporting the assigned cause. Specifically, participants 
were first asked to freely view the content of the initial campaign at their own pace. 
Different from Study 1, social norm messages were not embedded in the main page of the 
initial campaign. Participants in both social norms condition read the same content. 
However, when five seconds have elapsed, a popup message suddenly appeared in the 
center of the webpage saying, “…It is our responsibility to help underprivileged children 
 
2 Note that not only the internalization mean of the moral message condition was 
significantly higher than that of the no moral message condition, but also, at the absolute 
level, an average score of internalization was very high. This was not a unique case of the 
current research. Prior research also noted that internalization scores tend to be high (e.g., 
Winterich et al., 2013). Thus, reference to low internalization in the no moral message 
condition is not indicative of an absence of internalization; rather, it is lower in a relative 
sense such that moral identity may still be important to a person’s self-concept. 
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(homeless people)” – injunctive norms – or “…75% of people who visited this page 
supported this campaign” – descriptive norms (See Appendix G). After reading the 
popped-up social norm message, participants were led to the main page and asked to 
carefully view the rest of the main page again.  
After viewing the main page at a self-paced rate, participants answered questions 
concerning their willingness to support the initial campaign (WTS; M = 4.56, SD = 1.7, α 
= .94) and the willingness to engage in electronic word-of-mouth on online social sites 
(eWOM; M = 3.89, SD = 2.15, α = .92). Participants then completed the Self-Importance 
of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino and Reed, 2002; Internalization: M = 5.55, SD = 1.39, α 
= .91; Symbolization: M = 4.32, SD = 1.45, α = .92; explained variance = 74.8%). Upon 
completion of the filler task, participants viewed another campaign. Given that the order 
of the two campaigns was counterbalanced and the manipulation of the type of social 
norms was accomplished in the form of pop-up messages, the same stimuli could be used 
in both initial and subsequent campaigns without any adjustment. Considering that “Mary 
Rubin” was used for the underprivileged children campaign and “Paul Smith” was used 
for the homeless people campaign, participants were exposed to two authors, and the 
counterbalance of the order of two campaigns was believed to control for the gender 
effect.  
After two seconds participants started exploring the webpage for the second 
campaign, participants in the moral message condition read a popup message, saying 
“…You are a person who truly cares about people in need” (see Appendix H), whereas 
participants in the no moral message condition did not read this message and viewed the 
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webpage without any interruption. After reading the pop-up message, participants in the 
moral message condition were redirected to the webpage of the second campaign and 
finished reading the rest of the content. Exploration of the website was self-paced.  
After viewing the second campaign, all participants responded to measures for the 
two main dependent variables, which were the same as in the first campaign (i.e., WTS: 
M = 4.42, SD = 1.68 and eWOM: M = 3.84, SD = 1.93). They then answered to default 
questions regarding the website (i.e., believability, interest, trustworthiness, quality), the 
causes (i.e., the importance of the issues), the involvement with helping behavior (M = 
5.32, SD = 1.04, α = .91), and social norms manipulation. Participants in the moral 
message condition also responded to a question of whether they remember the moral 
message being presented or not. Six participants who failed to recall the moral message 
was excluded from the data, leaving 154 participants in total. At the end of the study, 
participants completed demographic measures and were thanked. 
RESULTS 
The results revealed that two causes (i.e., Helping underprivileged children and 
helping homeless people) were not significantly different in terms of believability 
(Mchildren  = 5.67 vs. Mhomeless  = 5.49; p > .1), interest (Mchildren  = 5.17 vs. Mhomeless = 5.21; p 
> .1), trustworthiness (Mchildren  = 5.2 vs. Mhomeless  = 5.32; p > .1), and writing quality 
(Mchildren = 5.38 vs. Mhomeless  = 5.31; p > .1). Participants also did not perceive the cause 
for underprivileged children (M = 5.65) to be socially more important than the cause for 
homeless people (M = 5.41; p > .05). Thus, the selection and manipulation of two 
campaigns’ webpages were effective and successful.  
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A MANCOVA was conducted to test whether social norms had differential effects 
on the change of WTS and eWOM between the initial and subsequent campaigns, and 
how moral message moderates these effects. The type of social norms and the presence of 
moral message were included in the model as independent variables. To capture the linear 
change of helping behaviors between two campaigns, two dependent variables were 
created by subtracting participants’ initial WTS and eWOM from that of the subsequent 
campaign (WTS: M = -.14, SD = 2.1; eWOM: M = -.06, SD = 2.26). The higher the 
scores were, the more participants wanted to support and recommend the subsequent 
campaign to others in social media. Involvement with helping behavior was included in 
the model as a covariate.  
The results revealed significant two-way interactions of social norms and moral 
message on the change of both participants’ willingness to support the campaigns (WTS; 
F(1, 149) = 11.08, p < .01) and electronic word-of-mouth (eWOM; F(1, 149) = 8.83, p < 
.01). A series of pairwise comparisons were conducted to better understand the nature of 
interactions. As shown in Figure 5 (next page), when the moral message was not 
presented, participants in the injunctive norms condition reported significantly higher 
WTS (M = 1.13, SD = 1.79) and eWOM (M = 1.1, SD = 1.66) than those in the 
descriptive norms condition (WTS: M = -1.66, SD = 1.58; F(1, 77) = 51.92, p < .001; 
eWOM: M = -1.94, SD = 2.56; F(1, 77) = 36.67, p < .001). Thus, H3a was supported, and 
this provided cumulative evidence that the type of social norms is the determinant of 
consistency (H1a) and licensing effect (H2a). Interestingly, different patterns of results 
were reported when the moral message was available. As expected, the WTS was not 
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different between the injunctive (M = .31, SD = 2.22) and descriptive norms conditions 
(M = -.46, SD = 1.71; p > .1), supporting H3b. However, a significant difference of 
eWOM between conditions of injunctive (M = .71, SD = 1.73) and descriptive norms (M 
= -.21, SD = 1.68; F(1, 71) = 5.02, p < .05) was found.  
The significant difference of eWOM between types of social norms did not 
necessarily mean that the licensing effect of descriptive norms was ‘not’ mitigated when 
the moral message is provided. It was speculated that eWOM in the injunctive norms 
remained high as they were not affected by the presence of the moral message, resulting 
in the difference. To capture differential effects of moral message, follow-up analyses 
were performed by comparing the changes of WTS and eWOM between conditions of 
moral message within each type of social norms (H4a and H4b). As expected, there were 
significant differences in terms of the change of eWOM depending on whether 
participants in the descriptive norms read the moral message (M = -.21, SD = 1.68) or not 
(M = -1.94, SD = 2.56; F(1, 72) = 10.76, p < .01), so did WTS (Moral message: M = -.46, 
SD = 1.71; No moral message: M = -1.66, SD = 1.58; F(1, 72) = 11.58, p = .001), 
supporting H4a. The scores of WTS and eWOM for participants in the injunctive norms 
condition were not significantly different regardless of whether the moral message was 
presented (WTS: M = .31, SD = 2.22; eWOM: M = .71, SD = 1,73) or not (WTS: M = 
1.13, SD = 1.79; F(1, 76) = 2.25, p = .14; eWOM: M = 1.1, SD = 1.66; F(1, 76) = .25, p > 
.1), supporting H4b. The results collectively indicated that the licensing effect of 
descriptive norms would be lessened when participants had a chance to incorporate the 
meaning of their past behavior into their self before making another moral decision.  
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      No Moral Message             Moral Message 
Figure 5. A Two-Way Interaction between Social Norms and Moral Message on the 
Change of Willingness to Support (WTS) and Electronic Word-of-Mouth 
(eWOM) (Note: The change of WTS (eWOM) was calculated by 
subtracting the WTS (eWOM) of the initial campaign from the WTS 
(eWOM) of the subsequent campaign. Higher scores indicate the increased 
WTS (eWOM) for the subsequent campaign. Involvement with helping 
behavior was included in the model as a covariate) 
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This research posited that moral message bolstering internal aspects of moral 
identity would moderate the mediating effect of moral symbolization on the licensing 
effect of descriptive norms (H5a). The mediating role of moral internalization would not 
be affected by the presence of moral message (H5b). These predictions were tested using 
Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) PROCESS macro (Model 14). Two types of social norms (-1 
= injunctive norms, 1 = descriptive norms) were included in the model as an independent 
variable. The two dimensions of moral identity, moral internalization and moral 
symbolization, were mean-centered and included in the model as mediators. The mean-
centered involvement with helping behavior was added in the model as a covariate. The 
moral message (No = -1, Yes = 1) was additionally included as a mediated moderator. 
The degrees of change in WTS and eWOM between the initial and subsequent campaign 
were used as dependent variables. See Figure 1 for the conceptual relationship between 
the variables.  
Concerning the moral symbolization, significant moderated mediation effects for 
both dependent variables (WTS: β = .19, 95% CI .03 to .42; eWOM: β = .2, 95% CI .04 
to .44) were found. Specifically, the mediating effect of moral symbolization was 
significant for WTS (β = -.24, 95% CI -.46 to -.07) and eWOM (β = -.17, 95% CI -.35 to 
-.04) when participants did not read the moral message. However, the presence of moral 
message resulted in the insignificant mediating effect of moral symbolization for WTS (β 
= -.04, 95% CI -.16 to .05) and eWOM (β = .03, 95% CI -.07 to .15). Thus, H5a was 
supported. The results suggested that descriptive norms (vs. injunctive norms) of the 
initial campaign decreased participants’ support for a subsequent campaign (WTS and 
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eWOM) through enhanced levels of moral symbolization. However, a moral message 
functioned to prevent decreases in WTS and eWOM even if moral symbolization was 
heightened when using descriptive norms (vs. injunctive norms) in the initial campaign.   
Regarding the moral internalization, the results showed that the moderated 
mediation for WTS was not reach to the significant level (β = .13, 95% CI -.1 to .36). The 
moderated mediation was also not significant for eWOM (β = .02, 95% CI -.22 to .24). 
These suggested that the moral message did not affect the mediating effect of moral 
internalization for both dependent variables. Thus, H5b was also supported. 
DISCUSSION IN BRIEF 
Study 3 expanded the scope of consistency and licensing effects by examining the 
role of a moral message as a moderator of the mediating effects of two moral identities. 
Specifically, the conditions under which the licensing effect of descriptive norms is 
mitigated was proposed. When consumers in the descriptive norms condition additionally 
received a moral message intensifying internal aspects of moral identity (e.g., “someone 
who cares about people in need”), their tendency to less support for the subsequent 
campaign became diminished. In addition to the mediating role of moral internalization, 
the moderating role of moral message provided indirect evidence that allowing 
consumers to have a sense of a good person is a key for their continuing prosocial 
behaviors for the future charitable social media campaigns.  
Study 3 took into account the degree of consumers’ intention to support for the 
initial campaign in predicting the likelihood of supporting the following campaign by 
using the same measurements in both initial and subsequent campaigns. From the 
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methodological point of view, this way of analysis was believed to more accurately 
capture the influence of an initial helping behavior on consumers’ subsequent helping 
behaviors than other ways previous research employed (e.g., using a discrete variable or 
controlling for the variance of the initial behavior). Moreover, the use of popup messages 
in a website of a fictitious charity suggested that the findings of the current research 
could be generalized to different online platforms, organizations, and causes.  
It was worth discussing the findings that participants in the injunctive norms 
condition exhibited decreased tendencies of WTS and eWOM with the presence of moral 
message (vs. no moral message). Although it did not reach to the significant level, the 
directions of the findings were opposite to the intuition that the consistency effect of 
injunctive norms might be stronger when a moral message is provided. The speculations 
were such that using a single normative information was enough to ‘activate’ the sense of 
what we ought to do. The repeated presence of similar ‘ought to do’ messages may 
disrupt their intrinsic and autonomous motivation to help others. Consumers may feel that 
they were being forced to be a good person and therefore expressed the decreased 
tendencies of helping others in the subsequent stage. 
Please see Table 2 (next page) for the summary of the findings.   
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Table 2. The Summary of Hypotheses Testing  
Studies Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
Dependent variables WTS eWOM eWOM 
Actual 
Donation 
WTS eWOM 
H1a: When injunctive norms are 
highlighted in the initial charitable 
campaign, participants are more 
likely to support the subsequent 
charitable campaign.  
Supp. 
□● 
Supp. 
□● 
Supp. 
□● 
Not 
Supp. 
  
H1b: The consistency effect of 
injunctive norms will be mediated by 
moral internalization.  
  Supp.● 
Not 
Supp. 
  
H2a: When descriptive norms are 
highlighted in the initial charitable 
campaign, participants are less likely 
to support the subsequent charitable 
campaign.  
Supp. 
□● 
Supp. 
□● 
Supp. 
□● 
Not 
Supp. 
  
H2b: The licensing effect of 
descriptive norms will be mediated 
by moral symbolization. 
  Supp.● 
Not 
Supp. 
  
H3a: When moral message is not 
available, participants in the 
injunctive norms condition are more 
likely to support the subsequent 
campaign than those in the 
descriptive norms condition. 
    Supp. ● Supp. ● 
H3b: When moral message is 
available, the likelihood of 
supporting the subsequent campaign 
will be not different between two 
social norms conditions. 
    Supp. ● 
Not 
Supp. ● 
H4a: Participants in the descriptive 
norms condition are more likely to 
support the subsequent campaign 
when the moral message is available 
(vs. not available). 
    Supp. ◊ Supp. ◊ 
H4b: Participants in the injunctive 
norms condition will not be 
influenced by the presence of moral 
message. 
    Supp. ◊ Supp. ◊ 
H5a: When moral message is 
available, moral symbolization will 
not mediate the licensing effect of 
descriptive norms. 
    Supp. ● Supp. ● 
H5b: Moral internalization will 
mediate the consistency effect of 
injunctive norms regardless of the 
presence of moral message. 
    Supp. ● Supp. ● 
Note: □ means comparisons were made between a type of social norms and control group 
          ● means comparisons were made between two types of social norms 
          ◊ means comparisons were made between two moral message conditions 
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CHAPTER 4. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Online charitable giving continued to show significant year-over-year growth based 
on its strategic effectiveness and cost efficiency. However, little was known about what 
drives consumers’ sustainable and enduring helping behavior. Mixed findings that were 
largely categorized into consistency (i.e., consumers help more after engaging in a 
prosocial behavior) or licensing (i.e., consumers help less after engaging in a prosocial 
behavior) were reported in the literature, as a result. This research was embarked on to 
address this gap and reconcile the conflicting findings. Two approaches to ethics 
(normative ethics and behavioral ethics) served as theoretical underpinnings for the 
understanding of consistency and licensing effect. Consumers behaved prosocially not 
only because they are good people but also because there is a societal pressure to be 
good. These two motives co-existed in the same individual and distinctively influenced 
consumers’ reactions to subsequent requests. In this light, the type of social norms was 
proposed as a factor determining whether consumers’ initial prosocial behavior facilitates 
or hinders their subsequent prosocial behavior.  
Across three studies, this paper empirically demonstrated that injunctive norms in 
the initial helping behavior led to increased meaningful support for a subsequent request. 
A message closely relating to the superordinate meaning of the behavior enabled 
consumers to keep moral identity at the center of the self. As a good person, their initial 
action served as a stepping stone to continuing support for their respective causes. The 
mediating effect of moral internalization supported this notion. On the contrary, 
descriptive norms activated a desire to be favorably viewed by others and made 
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consumers focus more on the action than its superordinate meaning. In this case, they 
became sensitive to what others were doing and were willing to behave in a consistent 
manner with them. The significant mediating effect of moral symbolization proved this 
argument. Descriptive norms appeared to be beneficial in generating greater support in 
response to a single and isolated request to give to a cause, but there was a backfire 
effect. This type of norm functioned to decrease in supporting subsequent requests 
because they achieved their goal by engaging in the initial request and did not have to 
present themselves in a positive light in later campaigns.  
The present research employed diverse causes that are important in society (helping 
underprivileged children, helping homeless people, and helping people with disabilities) 
in two different online flatforms (Facebook and a website). Different ways of social 
norms manipulations were also implemented to enhance the realism. Consistent patterns 
of results suggested that the theoretical framework was robust, and the findings could be 
generalizable to other causes and online platforms.  
Theoretical Implications 
This paper made several theoretical contributions. First, most research on prosocial 
behavior has focused on maximizing the effectiveness of a single and isolated prosocial 
campaign. However, this only captured a snapshot of a larger sustainable cycle. In the 
context of charitable campaigns in social media, the current research provided a more 
comprehensive explanation of how people’s prosocial decision making about a current 
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event can be affected by their past prosocial behavior or can influence future prosocial 
behavior.  
Second, there has been an unanswered question about when and why prior moral 
behavior leads people to do more or less. In particular, evidence for both significant 
consistency and licensing effects in the same study was nearly nonexistent in the prior 
research (Mullen and Monin, 2016). This paper demonstrated that the type of social norm 
could be a key construct that successfully flips consistency into licensing in the same 
sequential behavior paradigm. The findings integrated seemingly contradictory empirical 
evidence from past research. Notably, the theoretical framework of the current research 
was rooted in two different approaches to ethics: normative and behavioral ethics. This 
provided in-depth knowledge about what drives and distinguish consistency and licensing 
effects.  
Third, this study shed light on underlying mechanisms for the role of social norms 
on consistency and licensing effects by examining two dimensions of moral identity 
(moral internalization and moral symbolization). The accountability of these two moral 
identities was proved in both direct and indirect ways. In Study 2 and 3, moral 
internalization and moral symbolization were measured and shown to significantly 
mediated consistency and licensing effects of injunctive and descriptive norms, 
respectively. In Study 3, the presence of moral message successfully mitigated the 
licensing effect of descriptive norms on a subsequent request, providing indirect evidence 
that whether consumers put the morality at the center of their self through their initial 
prosocial behavior matters. 
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Fourth, this paper extended the breadth of the research on social norms and 
licensing by identifying several boundary conditions. The superiority of descriptive 
norms over injunctive norms has been documented (e.g., Angstrom et al., 2016; Cialdini, 
1991; Goldstein et al., 2008). However, there is a scarcity of research examining whether 
this finding would hold when people make a series of ethical decisions. This paper found 
that the dominant effect of descriptive norms over injunctive norms did not persistent in a 
follow-up request and even ended up with a backfire effect. In addition, the present 
research took a step forward, suggesting that the licensing effect of descriptive norms 
could be prevented with the presence of a moral message that bolsters the internal aspect 
of helping behavior (i.e., moral internalization).  
Practical Implications 
This research had important practical implications for charitable and other 
nonprofit organizations. Despite the consistent year-over-year growth of online giving, 
two-third of charities still felt that they are missing out on opportunities for digital 
fundraising (The Non Profit Times, 2018). It might because most social marketing 
focused on maximizing the effectiveness of a single campaign, ignoring how it influences 
potential donors’ reactions toward subsequent requests. In reality, donors give 42% more 
annually when setting up recurring donations, compared to one-time donations, and this 
accounted for 16% of online revenue in 2017 (The Non Profit Times, 2018). Given the 
importance of sustainable giving, appropriate marketing practice that bridges consumers’ 
one-time giving and regular giving should be employed.  
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For initial support, descriptive norms may lead to greater support for the cause than 
injunctive norms. This type of norms makes people focus on the action of others and 
behave in a way that is aligned with them. However, when the influence on consumers’ 
decision for future causes is considered, the findings of the present research indicated that 
the superiority of descriptive norms over injunctive norms may not always be the case. 
For the subsequent requests, descriptive norms elicited lower engagement from 
consumers than injunctive norms did. Their initial prosocial behavior ensured that their 
moral self was presented in a positive light to others, so they were not motivated to 
engage in subsequent causes. In this regard, this paper suggested that injunctive norms 
are more effectively drivers that encouraged consumers to engage in more sustainable 
and enduring helping behaviors than descriptive norms. The injunctive norms involved 
the perception of what one ought to do. Because this type of norm is closely related to the 
fundamental meaning of the behavior, it prompted consumers to be more likely to behave 
consistently for future causes.  
Charitable organizations can use the knowledge of this research in their practice in 
numerous ways. For instance, social media content should draw attention to the internal 
value of the behavior it stands for, and how these values reflect consumers’ moral 
internalization because it is certainly vital to keep moral behavior at the center of the self 
for the ongoing supporter. However, considering injunctive norms were found to be less 
effective in encouraging consumers to join an initial charitable campaign, emphasizing 
how those actions are favorably viewed by others could be a successful strategy for new 
donors. In this regard, the use of descriptive norms is also highly recommendable to 
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maximize the effectiveness of an initial campaign, but organizations should consider the 
boomerang effect of descriptive norms as mentioned early. The present research indicated 
that providing consumers with any type of messages (e.g., labeling, icons, etc.) that shift 
their attention to the connection between self and internal aspects of moral behavior (i.e., 
moral internalization) can prevent the boomerang effect of descriptive norms. This would 
allow consumers to continue to engage in subsequent meaningful support.  
A report from The Non Profit Times (2017) suggested when, where, and to whom 
the findings of this paper could be applied. Holidays are the biggest time of year for those 
in the non-profit domain. In 2016, just under 25% of all donations received annually were 
made in the roughly five-week period between Thanksgiving and New Year. Charitable 
organizations’ marketing activities should be intensively promoted during this time 
period, and the high frequency and shorten interval of requests would make potential 
donors to be more susceptible to the normative information of the campaigns. Concerning 
the media platform where donation campaigns should be run, websites are beneficial for 
those in the non-profit and charitable giving domain as they can easily manipulate 
content and user experience (UX) of the website. Social media is a critical factor in 
success. For instance, re-marketing on social networking sites, such as Facebook, Twitter, 
or LinkedIn increased traffic to donation pages, and it resulted in 63% more online 
donations. 21% of donations were directly through social. Among diverse social 
networking sites, it appears Facebook is the most effective social media for causes. For 
instance, the largest Giving Tuesday payment processing platforms in 2017 was 
Facebook ($125 million). 18% of donors worldwide had given through Facebook 
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fundraising tools, and of those, 88% said they were likely to give through Facebook 
fundraising tools in the future. Lastly, concerning target consumers at which 
organizations aim their campaigns, social marketers should attract Millennials. This age 
group accounts for 25.9% of the US population and is active on their smartphones and 
respond best to text message and social media. They are interested in diverse social issues 
such as public and societal benefit, human service, education, health, and environment 
and animals. In 2017, 84% of Millennials gave to charity, donating an average of $481 
across 3.3 organizations (The Non Profit Times, 2017). They were most likely to donate 
via online and watch online videos before making a gift.  
In conclusion, non-profit and charitable organizations should continue to utilize 
marketing practice that connects people’s helping behavior to the center of their self. The 
immediate effect of injunctive norms may not be apparent as it might not be wildly 
applauded by consumers at a glance. However, the initial action derived by injunctive 
norms will serve as a stepping-stone to continuing support for future causes. 
Limitations and Future Research 
There were several limitations to this research. First, it was still unclear whether the 
theoretical framework of this research was influential to consumers’ actual helping 
behaviors. In Study 2, participants’ actual donation was measured to address this issue, 
but the low rate of actual donation and the lack of sufficient information in the 
experimental design resulted in unmeaningful outcomes. Despite the significant findings 
regarding other variables (e.g., the willingness to support the campaign and electronic 
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word-of-mouth), there still was a concern that consumers’ prosocial decisions could be 
exaggerated in a controlled lab setting (Levitt and List, 2007). Thus, future research 
should examine whether findings of the current research were flawed by the attitude-
behavior gap. A field study not only would provide opportunity to look at other important 
dependent variables such as volunteering for the cause, but also would ensure external 
validity of the present research.  
Second, even if the focus of this research was on consumers’ sustainable cycle of 
prosocial behaviors, the investigation of the social norm effect of the initial campaign 
was limited to a single follow-up request. It was because this research placed more 
weight on theorizations of how an initial helping behavior impacts on a subsequent 
behavior than practical applications. In reality, however, consumers are usually asked to 
participate in three to seven campaigns after engaging in an initial prosocial behavior. It 
was still questionable how persistent the influence of social norms in the initial campaign 
would be. Social norms in the initial request may have an enduring effect on these 
following requests, or the secondary helping behavior could possibly serve as a new 
reference point that determines consumers’ consistency and licensing tendencies for the 
rest of the requests.  
Third, in addition to the number of causes, the time interval between requests is 
another area of interest. In this research context, participants worked on a filler task for 
about 3 minutes before engaging in a subsequent request. Cialdini et al. (1991) noted that 
social norms not only guide how individuals are expected to behave in a given situation 
but also remind them of what constitutes socially acceptable behavior over a long period 
 
67 
in the future. In this light, the following questions are raised. Will the influence of social 
norms be stronger or weaker after a brief delay vs. a long delay? What would be the 
prime-time interval between requests in which social norms would generate the strongest 
effect?  
Fourth, the individual differences in moral identity could be more carefully dealt 
with. As mentioned early, the moral identity scale (Aquino and Reed, 2002) was 
originally developed to capture individuals’ moral traits. However, this research assumed 
that the random assignment of participants to the conditions would cancel out 
confounding effects of participants’ dispositional characteristics and not affect the results. 
In support of the prediction, the present research consistently found that leveraging social 
norms successfully activates a certain dimension of moral identity throughout a series of 
pretests and main experiments. Nevertheless, it was still not clear to what extent 
participants’ moral traits contributed to the results. To resolve this concern, participants’ 
moral identity might need to be pre-measured and controlled for. Alternatively, moral 
identity could be manipulated rather than being measured to minimize the confounding 
effect. Given that the consistency effect of injunctive norms and the licensing effect of 
descriptive norms were accounted by two different dimensions of moral identity, moral 
identity could have an interactive relationship with social norms. Specifically, the match 
between injunctive (descriptive) norms and moral internalization (moral symbolization) 
could activate a similar mode of mental representation, thus leading to stronger 
consistency (licensing) effects on the subsequent request. However, when social norms 
are mismatched with moral identity, they might not be effective in predicting the support 
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for the subsequent campaign. Investigating the interaction between social norms and 
moral identity could provide supportive evidence that two dimensions of moral identity 
are underlying mechanisms of the role of social norms on consistency and licensing 
effects. 
Lastly, the current research confined to a moral message that emphasizes only 
internal aspects of moral behavior to examine whether connecting helping behavior with 
internal aspects of moral identity can alleviate the licensing effect of descriptive norms. 
The contribution of this research could be further extended if it added a condition in 
which the moral message was manipulated to emphasize external aspects of helping 
behavior as well. Do consumers in the injunctive norms condition become less likely to 
support the subsequent campaign if they receive a moral message that bolsters moral 
symbolization? As briefly discussed in Study 3, the impact of an additional moral 
message may involve qualitatively different psychological processes.  
Based on two philosophical approaches to ethics (normative and behavioral), this 
research identified two motives for helping behaviors (as a good person and to be a good 
person) that account for the consistency and licensing effects. In a rigorous experimental 
setting, this paper provided empirical evidence when and why consumers do or do not 
continue to help others by exploring the roles of social norms and moral identity. Good 
contributions to the body of knowledge were made in this paper, but there much 
remained to be learned. This research, thus, will serve as a platform for understanding 
and further clarifying divergent findings in the prosocial literature, and setting an agenda 
for future research.   
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Facebook Fundraiser Page (Control Condition) 
CAUSE #1: HELPING UNDERPRIVILEGED CHILDREN 
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CAUSE #2: HELPING HOMELESS PEOPLE 
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Appendix B: Facebook Fundraiser Page (Two Types of Social Norms) 
CAUSE #1: HELPING UNDERPRIVILEGED CHILDREN 
Injunctive norms 
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Descriptive norms 
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CAUSE #2: HELPING HOMELESS PEOPLE 
Injunctive norms 
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Descriptive norms 
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Appendix C: Animal Crossword Puzzle as A Filler Task 
 
 
 
1. Big animal that has one horn 
2. This animal has a long trunk 
3. This animal has a very long neck 
4. This animal likes to eat carrots and sugar cubes 
5. This animal loves bananas 
6. Man's best friend 
7. Some say this animal has nine lives 
8. Lives in the cold and waddles 
9. Slow moving and has a shell 
10. Has big ears and likes to hop 
11. King of the jungle 
12. Striped animal that looks like a horse 
13. Can swim under water and walk on land and has a big bite 
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Appendix D: Questionnaire Items 
Content (A seven-point semantic differential scale) 
1. Unbelievable – Believable 
2. Unintersting – Interesting 
3. Untrustworthy – Trustworthy  
4. Poorly written – Well written 
 
Importance of Causes (A seven-point Likert-type scale; 1 = Not at all, 7 = A great deal) 
1. To what extent do you think “Helping underprivileged children” is an important 
issue in our society? 
2. To what extent do you think underprivileged children are those in need? 
 
Perception of Social Norms (A seven-point Likert-type scale; 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = 
Strongly agree; Lapinski et al., 2013)  
1. The information presented in the Facebook page indicated that most people who 
visited this campaign page helped underprivileged children (D). 
2. From the information from the Facebook page, it seems that there are many 
people who helped underprivileged children (D). 
3. The information presented in the Facebook page indicated that helping 
underprivileged children is what we ought to do (I).  
4. From the information from the Facebook page, it seems that helping 
underprivileged children is approved behavior (I). 
(Note: D = Descriptive norm item; I = Injunctive norm item) 
 
Normative Belief (A seven-point Likert-type scale; 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly 
agree; Lapinski et al., 2013) 
1. I think that most people who visited this campaign page helped underprivileged 
children (D).  
2. I think helping underprivileged children is our responsibility (I).  
(Note: D = Descriptive norm item; I = Injunctive norm item) 
 
Willingness to Support the Campaign (WTS) (A seven-point Likert-type scale; 1 = 
Extremely unlikely, 7 = Extremely likely; White & Peloza, 2009)  
1. How likely are you to support this cause? 
2. How inclined are you to support this cause? 
3. How willing are you to support this cause? 
 
Electronic Word-of-Mouth on Online Social Sites (eWOM) (A seven-point Likert-
type scale; 1 = Extremely unlikely, 7 = Extremely likely; Eisingerich et al., 2015) 
1. To what extent is it likely that you say positive things about this cause on social 
sites such as Facebook? 
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2. To what extent is it likely that you use social sites to encourage friends and 
relatives to participate in this cause? 
3. To what extent is it likely that you recommend this cause on social sites such as 
Facebook? 
 
Involvement with Helping Behavior (A seven-point Likert-type scale; 1 = Very 
infrequently, 7 = Very frequently) 
1. How frequently do you typically help people in need? 
2. How often do you give to charitable organizations? 
3. How often do you volunteer for charitable organizations? 
 
Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale (A seven-point Likert-type scale; 1 = Strongly 
disagree, 7 = Strongly agree; Aquino & Reed, 2002)  
     Instructions: Listed alphabetically below are some characteristics that might describe 
you. 
Caring, Compassionate, Fair, Friendly, Generous, Helpful, Hardworking, Honest, Kind 
For a moment, visualize yourself who has these characteristics. Imagine how you would 
think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of how it would be like, please indicate 
your agreement with each statement below.  
1. It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics (I) 
2. Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am (I) 
3. I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics (S) 
4. I would be ashamed to be a person who having these characteristics (I/R) 
5. The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as 
having these characteristics (S) 
6. The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me as having these 
characteristics (S) 
7. Having these characteristics is not really important to me (I/R) 
8. The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my 
membership in certain organizations (S) 
9. I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have these 
characteristics (S) 
10. I strongly desire to have these characteristics (I) 
(Note: I = internalization item; S = symbolization item; R = reversed-coded) 
 
Description of Consent Agreement on Actual Donation 
   If you press “Yes, I'll chip in 50 cents”, you will enter the information into our database 
and certify that you have agreed to support this campaign. Once signed up, the reward of 
the current survey (50 cents) will be automatically deducted and go to the We Support. 
Supporting this campaign is completely voluntary. You may refuse to donate without any 
penalty. The details of the agreement, as well as the payment processing, will be shown at 
the end of the survey. 
(Note: Response options were (1) Yes, I’ll chip in 50 cents and (2) No, thank you) 
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Appendix E: Facebook Fundraiser Page and Social Norms 
Manipulations 
CAUSE #3: HELPING PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 
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Injunctive norms 
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Descriptive norms 
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Appendix F: Front Pages of Website 
CAUSE #1: HELPING UNDERPRIVILEGED CHILDREN 
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CAUSE #2: HELPING HOMELESS PEOPLE 
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Appendix G: Two Types of Social Norms 
INJUNCTIVE NORMS 
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DESCRIPTIVE NORMS 
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Appendix H: Moral Message 
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